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STUDENT NOTES
Consumer Protection-The Holder-In-Due-Course
Defense In Consumer Sales
Many commercially-naive buyers in this state have been subjected to a consumer hoax of significant proportions. The mode of
operation varies slightly with the type of product sold, but the
consumer contact generally is initiated by salesman who, through
various misrepresentations, pursuades the consumer to contract for
a product worth only a fraction of its cost'. Often the contract is
evidenced by the execution of a promissory note and some type
of security instrument.2 Within a short time, the seller assigns the
indebtedness to a financial institution with which he has a prior
agreement or some continuing business relationship.8 Often the
financial arrangements with this type of transaction can be better
characterized as an indirect loan between the financing agency
and the buyer, with the seller merely procurring the loan for the
financer. 4 If the defrauded buyer decides to withhold payment the
1 A common example is the home remodeling scheme. A salesman presents himself at the door of a low-income person who owns his own home and
lot (which are generally valued in the neighborhood of $500 to $3500). He
asks the homeowner if he needs his debts consolidated and/or what improvement he needs to his home. After securing an answer, the salesman informs
him that he can get his bills paid as well as getting the home improvement
generally siding, a roof, or a bathroom), and his payments will be lower
thah at present, and perhaps for a shorter period of time. The salesman then
requests the consumer's signature on papers-supposedly "credit applications"
necessary to secure the loan. These "credit applications" are later found to be
a blank sales contract, a blank deed of trust, and a blank promissory note.
(Often the individual will know that he signed a contract, but seldom is he
aware of a security interest taken in his property.) A few days later, two or
three laborers perform a small amount of shoddy, incomplete work and then
leave. The ratio of cost to value received is often as high as eight to one. Other
well-known examples include the sale of home appliances, magazine subscriptions, hearing aids, chinchillas, and home furnishings.
2 This is especially true in sales involving high-priced goods or services.
3 Normally, the financial institutions do business with a limited number
of sellers. When financing agencies enter into either a written agreement or
merely a verbal understanding with a seller to purchase obligations at a specific discount rate, generally the financer furnishes interest rate tables, mandates certain contractual provisions and provides form instruments that the
seller is to use in his transactions.
4In this indirect financing arrangement, the seller initiates contact
with the buyer, who promises to pay the purchase price in installments to
the seller. But prior to consumer contact, the financial institution has supplied the seller with printed forms (e.g., promissory notes, contracts, credit
applications, security instruments, and completion certificates), and prescribed
a procedure for the seller to follow in credit sales. (In the home improvement
industry, the seller is directed to secure the buyer's signature to a credit application and an installment note at the time of the execution of the contract.
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financial institution brings suit on the note, claiming to be a holder in due course as to any defenses asserted by the buyer.5 Or perhaps, the buyer consults with a lawyer who explains to him why
his defenses are most likely unassertable against the assignee of the
indebtedness.0 In either event, the consumer must then pay the
note, and is often unable to secure recovery against the original
seller because he cannot be found or is judgment-proof, or because the buyer is unable to secure the services of an attorney in
light of the minimal recovery generated in such cases. This note
proposes to examine the legal theories which may be invoked by
consumers attempting to prevail against a financing agency allegation of good-faith purchase.
The plight of the consumer in such situations is causing significant alterations in the concept of the holder in due course as it
relates to the financing of consumer sales transactions. The inequities resulting from the application of the good-faith purchase
concept to 'situations involving dose business relationships between the seller and the financer have been recognized by writers7
The credit application is forwarded to the financing agency which approves
the loan. Upon completion of the work, the seller presents a completion certificate, the buyer's name often being affixed by the seller, and the note is
then negotiated to the financial institution.) This whole arrangement is described as an indirect loan because the financing agency has effectively made a
loan of money to the buyer, the loaned money going directly to the seller for
the product or home improvement, with the buyer repaying the financer
directly in installments.
5 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-306; W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 3,§ 306
(Michie 1966) 0 Of the many consumers who are defrauded, the few who seek legal advice are able to obtain little service from the legal profession. The attorney,
faced with the difficulties of proof when dealing with a firm claiming the
status of a bona fide purchaser, often negotiates a settlement with the financial institution whereby a small proportion of the cost is knocked off in
return for a promise not to sue. The original price was so excessive and the
discount rate to the finance company so large that it can easily absorb a small
cut in its profit in the minimal number of obligations it has to reduce. The
result is the consumer has to pay an unconscionable amount to the finance
company, which continues to pursue its lucrative scheme with the seller.
7 Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1966); Note, Judicial and
Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a "Holder in Due Course" in Consumer
Transactions, B. C. IND. g: CoM. L. Ray. 91 (1970); Littlefield, Good Faith
Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL.
L. REV. 48 (1966); McEwen, Economics Issues in State Regulation of Consumer
Credit, 8 B. C. IND. 84 Com. L. REv. 387 (1967); P. Wald, Report to the National Conference on Law and Poverty 24 (June 1965); Comment, Consumer
Protection-The Role of Cut-off Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 Wis. L.
REV. 505 (1968); Comment, Consumer Financing, Negotible Instruments, and
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Solution to the Judical Dilemma, 55 CORNELL
L. REV. 611 (1970); Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer
Credit Problems, 8 B. C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 409 (1967); Note, Financing
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and judges. Several jurisdictions have recently ameliorated the problem by legislative prohibition or by severe restriction of the
negotiation of consumer sales paper.8 In an attempt to avoid injustice to the consumer, many courts have refused to grant preferred positions to financial institutions. But in refusing to grant
protected status to purchasers of consumer sales paper in cases
involving a dose seller-financing agency relationship, the legal
theories applied by the courts have been varied and unpredictable. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in deciding
good-faith purchaser issues, has generally invoked the terminology of the statute in a concusionary manner without prescribing
an explicit, comprehensive rule to apply to all actual situations.9 Though some courts have designed common law rules, 10
ample authority exists in West Virginia to permit a strong judicial pronouncement which could significantly limit this systematic
consumer deception.
A. The Pre-U.C.C. Approach
The question of good-faith purchase of commercial paper had
common law origins. A clear bifurcation of authority as to whether
there was a duty to make inquiry prior to purchase arose in the
early eighteenth century.1 ' Some courts require that the purchaser's
actual knowledge of a defense of the maker must be shown to deConsumer Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code: Installment Buyers
and Defaulting Sellers, 37 U. CI. L. REV. 513 (1970); Note, A Case Study of the
Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the
Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969); Murphy, Another "Assault Up.
on the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotible Notes and Waiver of Defense
Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 Ohio St. L.J. 667 (1968); Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
8 See e.g., ALAS STAT. §45.50.541 (Supp. 1970); ARiz. REv. STAT. tit. 44, §5005
(Supp. 1971); CAl. CIVIL CODE §1810.7 (West Supp. 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §42-136 (Supp. 1970); DsL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §4342 (Supp. 1968); HAWAI
REV. STAT. §476-18 (1968); IDAHO LAws ch. 181, §10 (CCH CONS. CRED. GUIDE
1119,611-3 (April 13, 1971)); ILL R-v. STAT. ANN. ch. 121 1/2 §262D (SmithHurd Supp. 1970); IND. LAWs tit. 24, art. 4.5 (CCH CONS. CRm. GUIDE
5005
(April 13, 1971) ); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §147 (1969); MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS.
ch. 255, §12C (1968); N.J. REv. STAT. tit. 17, §16C64.1 (1970) (home repair,
contracts only); N.Y. PEs. PPTv. LAW § 408 (McKinney Supp. 1970); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §2-403 (Supp. 1970); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, §748 (Supp.
1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS tit. 6, art. 27, §6 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 70,
§2-403 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §2455 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. tit. 63, §14.020 (Supp. 1970); Wyo. LAws ch. 191 (CCH CONS. CarD.
GUIE ff 4770 (April 13, 1971)).
9 See, e.g., notes 71-78 infra.
10 See, e.g., text at notes 17-21 infra.
"'This subjective-objective differentiation arose with the famous cases
of Lawson v. Weston, 170 Eng. Rep. 640 (Esp. 1801) and Goodman v. Harvey, 111 Eng. Rep. 1028 (B. & Ad. 1834), which held that there was no duty
upon the purchaser to make inquiries, and Gill v. Cubitt, 107 Eng. Rep. 806
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feat one asserting the status of a holder in due course. This is
known as the subjective test. The objective test requires that the
purchaser must use the means of an ordinary prudent man to ascertain the manner in which the instrument was obtained. The
N.I.L., being generally a restatement of basic common law, did not
alter this subjective-objective differentiation. Lack of, or inadequate
definition of terms permitted the continuation of jurisdictional
variations as to what facts were sufficient to deny one the status
of a good-faith purchaser. Notice was defined as the purchaser's
"actual knowledge of the infirmity" or his "knowledge of such facts
that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith." 12
Though the initial portion of this "notice" definition clearly indicates a subjective test, the latter provision contemplates judicial
construction."$ Each court, in deciding what "facts" were sufficient
to constitute bad faith, made its own determination as to where its
test fell in the subjective-objective dichotomy. 14 This definition of
notice, partially in terms of bad faith, and the lack of statutory
definition of good faith led courts to consider the pre-conditions of
lack of notice and good faith as a single requirement, using the
terms almost interchangeably." 5 The unitary treatment of these
prerequisites has been followed by the West Virginia Court. 6
(B. & C. 1824), which mandated that the jury must consider whether the purchaser acquired the paper under circumstances which ought to have made a
prudent man suspicious. For a discussion of the common law development of
the bifurcated law of good faith, see Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48, 50-52
(1966) '
.2N.I.L.
§ 56; AcTs op Tr= W. VA. LEG. ch. 81, § 6, Req. Sess. (1907).
"3What are the "facts" which are sufficient to fall within the meaning of
this section? This is a question that can only be decided on a case-by-case
basis. See notes 100-07, mfra, and accompanying text for general authority;
notes 71-78 infra, for West Virginia authority.
14 For example, one court can declare that a showing that the financers
name appeared on the instruments is not sufficient "facts" to warrant imputing
knowledge within the meaning of the definition. E.g., Implement Credit Corp.
v. Elsingem, 268 Wis. 143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954); another will find that the
same circumstance (finance company's name on forms) warrants an imputation of notice. E.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 139 S.W.2d
260 (1940).

ISE.g., Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 590-91, 181 A.2d
809, 818 (1962).
10 E.g., Merchants & Miners Bank v. Caujot, 102 W. Va. 643, 136 SMF.199
(1926). "A purchaser in good faith should be one who has purchased with
due regards to the rights of the maker, and not one who, relying on paying
value for the note and purchasing before maturity without knowledge of any
defense, is indifferent as to whether the same was honestly obtained from
the maker." Id. at 649, 136 S.E. at 201; Marion Nat'l Bank v. Hardin, 83
W. Va. 119, 97 S.. 600 (1918). In discussing the good faith prerequisite, the
Court spoke of "knowledge of facts sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry
without actual knowledge" and circumstances "so cogent and obvious that to
remain passive would amount to bad faith.' Id. at 124-25, 97 S.E. at 602.
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The basic consideration of what "facts" are requisite to deny
preferred status to a purchaser of commercial paper pursuant to
the N.I.L. has led courts to formulate certain "tests" to apply to
varying factual situations. Many courts specify that certain facts
denote a "close connection" between the seller and the finance
company which in itself deprives the purchaser of good faith
status.'7 Other courts have found that this close financer-seller relationship is sufficient to warrant denominating the financer the
"original party"18 or a "co-participant"' 9 in the transaction. Still
other courts declare that this close business relationship makes the
financer the seller's principal within the meaning of common law
principles of agency. 20 Another approach is merely to impute notice
or lack of good faith from certain minimal facts. 21 The significance
of these legal formulae rests in their focus on the basic issue the nature and extent of the relationship between the seller and
the financial institution.

17

The often-cited case of Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073,

137 S.W.2d 260 (1940), contains the basic formulation of this concept:
We think appellant [the financer] was so closely connected with
the entire transaction or with the deal that it cannot be heard to say
that it, in good faith, was an innocent purchaser of the instrument for
value before maturity. It financed the deal, prepared the instrument,
and on the day it was executed took an assignment of it ....

Rather

than being a purchaser of the instrument after its execution it was to
all intents and purposes a party of the agreement and instrument
from the beginning.
Id. at 1077, 137 S.W.2d at 262. The rule of Childs was explicitly adopted in
Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).

Is E.g., Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d 296, 299 (9th
Cir. 1967); Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969). (note
executed prior to effective date of U.C.C. in jurisdiction); Davis v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950). See also Westfield Inv.
Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 591, 181 A2d 809, 818 (L. Div. 1962).
("inextricably a part of the original transaction"); Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 771, 214 P.2d 819, 822 (1950)
("moving force").
'9 E.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 123, 232 A.2d 405, 417 (1969); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 771, 214
P.Zd 819, 822 (1950).
20 E.g., Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225, 228 (D.C. Cir.
1941); Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494, 496 (D. C. Ct. App.
(1968); Int'l Finance Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1969).
21E.g., Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712
(1967): from facts showing the seller's fraudulent reputation, a high discount
rate, and a prior course of dealing, the court declared that the financer
"could not consciously ignore the plain facts surrounding the transaction and
still maintain that it purchased the instruments in good faith." Id. at 585, 229
A.2d at 716.
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B. The Legal Grounds
1 Absence of Good Faith
An assignee of consumer paper claiming to be a holder in due
course may be denied preferred status by a declaration that the purchaser failed to meet the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) prerequisite of good faith.231 A factual showing of the puchasers' knowledge of the questionable business reputation of the seller, of his
prior dealings with the seller, or of his close connection with the
seller in this transaction could warrant a legal determination of
lack of good faith.
In Star Credit Corporation v. Molina,2 3 a New York court
relied on the meaning of the term "good faith" as used in the
Code to declare that a buyer's defenses could be asserted against
an assignee.24 Noting the Code definition and the Official Comment, 25 the court declared that the term "stands for honesty and
perhaps more." 20 The court then went directly to the essential
factual issue:
We need not pause in the abstract for a definition
of "good faith" appropriate to this case. The evidence
demonstrates that:
Each contract bears on its reverse side a printed assignment form;
Each contract was in fact assigned within twenty-four
hours of its execution;
Each contract contains provisions dealing with the
rights of a "holder" or "assignee" as well as of a seller;
Star [the assignee] took each contract at a discount of
20 percent from face value;
The account number noted on each contract by the
seller was the account number used by Star;
Each contract was signed by the seller "subject to ap2
proval of Buyer's credit." 7
From this evidence the court determined that the seller entered
into contracts not for the primary purpose of selling goods, "but
2V

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

3-302

(1) (b); W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 3,

§ 302 (1) (b) (Michie 1966). The statutory definition of good faith is 'Honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." UNIFORM COIMERCIAL
CODE § 1-201 (19); W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 1, § 201 (19) (Michie 1966).
257 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1969).
24298 N.Y.S.2d at 575. Also, Star Credit Corp. v. Crumb, 7 U.C.C. Rptg.
Serv. 251 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
25" 'Good Faith' whenever it is used in the Code, means at least what
is here stated." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201, Comment 19.
20 Star Credit Corp. v. Molina, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570, 573 (1969).
27298 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
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primarily to obtain commercial paper for assignment."2 8 The circumstances warranted the imputation that the assignee "accepted
assignments with full knowledge of the seller's conduct and intention," and accordingly the court held that the purchaser was "not
an assignee of these contracts 'in good faith."29
A Pennsylvania Court in Norman v. World Wide Distributors-° reached a similar conclusion after considering the relationship of the seller and a financial institution. Relying on the U.C.C.
requirement of good faith and its statutory definition, the court
analyzed the factual setting, which included the financer's knowledge of the seller's dubious sales techniques, the seller's frequent
changing of name, and a large discount rate. The court determined that these circumstances demanded that the financer
inquire into the operation of the seller, and no such inquiry having
been made, the financer was held to have knowledge of all that
one would have revealed, In denying the protected position to the
purchaser for lack of good faith, the court stated:
He who seeks protection as a holder in due course must
have dealt fairly and honestly in acquiring the instrument
as to the rights, of prior parties, and where circumstances
are such as to justify the conclusion that the failure to
make inquiry arose from a suspicion that inquiry would
disclose a vice or defect in the title, the person is not a
holder in due course. 32
This language, suggesting the historical subjective test, is consistent with the realities of business conduct in the consumer financing industry. It is not unrealistic to infer a lack of honesty in relation to the rights of the consumer when the evidence indicates,
for example, a consumer defense of fraud by the seller,
printed forms supplied by the financing agency, and knowledge
of the seller's dubious sales reputation. The objective of creating
defense-free consumer paper is readily apparent from such evidence,
and the factual circumstances manifesting a symbiotic seller-financer relationship together with the unlawful techniques of the
seller easily defeat a claim of "honest" acquisition of the
instruments.

281d.

29298 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75.
30202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
31 Id. at
32ld.

58, 195 A.2d at 118.
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This approach to the definition of good faith has not gone
without critisism.3 3 In recalling the historical objective-subjective
dichotomy, some writers argue that such cases violate the legislative history of the concept of good faith. In contrast to the later
drafts, two early drafts of the U.C.C. included with the good-faith
requirement an additional clause compelling the observance of
"reasonable commercial standards." 34 The later elimination of
this clause is said to support the contention that a subjective test
for the meaning of "good faith" was intended by the drafters of
the Code. 5 It is just as rational to argue, however, that due to
the controversy over this section 6 the real intent was to state a
definition so ambiguous as to be offensive to no one, thereby leaving the issue for the courts. This is, in fact, what has happened.
The courts in Molina and Norman, applying the good-faith
requirement, clearly recognized the realities in the consumer. sales
paper industry. A showing of circumstances indicating close sellerfinancer ties warrants a finding of lack of honesty, in that many
circumstances of business interrelationship manifest an intent to
create consumer paper in order to subvert the consumers' rights.
Other courts relying on the "good faith" requirement of the
U.C.C. holder-in-due-course concept have found a lack of good
faith based on seller-financer involvement without articulating
37
their reasons.
33
E.g., Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure
of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv.48, 56-59 (1966) ; Comment, Consumer
Financing,Negotiable Instruments, and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Solution to the Judicial Dilemma, 55 CORNEL L. REV. 611, 616 (1970).
84 The 1949 draft prescribed the holder in due course prerequistes as they
now stand but defined "good faith" as follows:
'Good Faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. Good faith includes good faith toward all prior parties and observance by a person of the reasonable commercial standards of any
business or trade in which he is engaged.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (16) (1949 Draft).
The 1952 draft prescribed the current definition of the term "good faith," but

included in the statute prescribing the pre-conditions the requirement that
the assignee take the instrument "in good faith including observance of the
reasonable commercial standards of any business in which the holder may be

engaged . . ." UNIFORM COMMERICIAL CODE § 3-302 (1) (b) (1952 Draft).
35 Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the
Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48, 57-59 (1966).

88
See Id.
3

7E.g., American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 45 Ohio Op.
2d 2, 240 N.E2d 886 (1968). From the evidence that (I) the assignee approved
arrangement to buy notes from seller, (2) the assignee supplied the form
instruments, (3)the assignee reserved the right to refuse notes, and (4) the
assignee investigated the credit of each buyer, the court, noting the U.C.C.
requirement of good faith, denied preferred status to the finance company
because of the close relationship, citing a host of pre-Code decisions.
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2. Notice
The U.C.C. provision requiring that a purchaser be without
notice of any defense to be accorded the status of a holder in due
course38 has been employed by courts on numerous occasions to
deny the protected status to a purchaser. The statutory definition
of notice,3 9 including both actual knowledge and reason to know,
is sufficiently broad to permit courts to prohibit inequities involving a defense of bona fide purchase. "Reason to know" a fact
by inference "from all the facts and circumstances"4 0 includes that
knowledge or those suppositions which can be deduced from knowledge of other facts. The court in United States Finance Company
v. Jones4 discussed this issue thoroughly. Beginning with the definition of notice, the court proceeded to examine the factual
circumstances from which it imputed knowledge to the financer.
After noting a technical defect in the acknowledgment, the court
discussed the fact that the mortgage and certificate of completion
were executed on the same date, declaring that taking the instrument under such circumstances "smacks of bad faith." 42 Evidence
showing many assignments from the seller to the financer was declared sufficient in itself to impute notice, in that, "[i] t taxes
credulity to accept the contention that ... [the financer] did not
have notice of ... [the seller's] fraud and manner of dealing with
people from his many transactions with [the financer] ...... 4 The
court indicated that the fifty percent discount rate was not in itself sufficient to constitute notice, but with other suspicious circumstances would be sufficient to warrant a finding of notice. 4 The
court then declared that, within the meaning the of U.C.C.'s
definition of notice, the financer "was not a holder in due course,
since it, through its agents, servants or employees had knowledge,

38 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302 (1) (c); W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 3,
§ 302 (1) (c) (Michie 1966).
89 A person has "notice" of a fact when
(
he has actual knowledge of it; or
he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in
question he has reason to know that it exists.
UNIFORM COMMERICIAL CODE § 1-201 (25); W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. I § 201
(25) (Michie 1966).
40 Id. § 1-201 (25) (c).
285 ALA. 105, 229 So. 2d 495 (1969).
42 Id. at 108, 229 So. 2d at 497.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 108, 229, So. 2d at 497-98.
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or had possession of knowledge of facts sufficient to impute
45
knowledge."
This concept of notice enunciated in Jones is realistic in light
of the mode of operation of the consumer financing industry.
Knowledge of certain facts does give "reason to know" the seller's
dealings within the meaning of the "notice" definition. Finance
companies dealing in consumer paper have a wealth of information available to them concerning the sellers from whom they purchase commercial paper.46 Knowledge of the business reputation of
the seller acquired from such sources as Dun & Bradstreet, Better
Business Bureau, and fellow financial institutions is kell known
to them before they make purchases from the sellers.4 7 Generally
the financing agency checks with suppliers and other businesses
who might have dealt with the seller. Many contact the consumer
by telephone and even conduct on-site inspections of the seller's
work. Though "reason to know" may not be present in strict commercial paper situations48 in which the dealings can more nearly
be described as arm's length, the transfer of consumer sales paper
invariably involves a business relationship between the transferor
and transferee. 49 Consistent with this business relationship, the
$.reason to know" provision has been construed by some courts, and
rationally so, to impose a duty to inquire into the circumstances
of each transaction before purchasing sales obligations."
45

Id.

at 109, 229, So. 2d at 498.

46 For- the empirical study of the issues, see Note, A Case Study of the

Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the
Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969).
47 Often this is the basic determinant of the discount rate the financer
will offer the seller for the paper.
48For example, in Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.,
807 F. Supp. 648 (D. Mass. 1969), the court held that the assignee's knowledge
of the payee's insolvency did not constitute "facts and circumstances" that
would give it "reason to know" within the meaning of the U.C.C. definition
of notice of a defense of fraud by the maker. This case was upheld on appealsee note 49 infra.
49 The First Circuit has pointed out in an extensive discussion that the
circumstances involving a consumer note and a bill of exchange are manifestly
distinct: The court explained that a consumer-maker of a note has no way
to investigate the honesty of the person with whom he deals, while a bank or
finance company finds it easy to check the honesty and competence of those
who regularly present consumer paper for discounting. Secondly, the court
pointed out that with a check being the major method of transfer of funds
in commercial practice, the parties naturally expect it to be rapidly negotiated
which is not the case with a consumer note. Bowling Green Inc. v. State Street
Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81, 85-86 (1st Cir. 1970).
GOAn Illinois Court in Winter &cHirsch, Inc. v. Passarelli, 122 Ill. App. 2d
372, 259 N.E.2d 312 (1970), declared that a party had "reason to know" of the
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Other courts have relied on the "without notice" requirement
of the U.C.C. holder-in-due-course concept to disallow preferred
status without going into the statutory definition of notice.-' A
New Jersey court, reciting several factual circumstances, simply stated that the facts warranted a finding that the financer "had actual
knowledge (rather than a mere suspicion) of the legal deficiencies
in the transaction." 52 Judicial recognition that circumstances of
dose business involvement are indicative of actual knowledge or
"reason to know" within the meaning of the U.G.C. definition of
notice has been the most widely accepted technique to deny enhanced status to financial institutions.

defense of usury within the meaning of the U.C.C. definition of notice when
the principal amount was not filled in on a note. The court declared:
The intendment of these provisions would seem to be an attempt
to prevent those dealing in the commercial world from obtaining various rights when, from a reasonable inquiry into the true facts that
person would have discovered that a fact existed which prevented him
from obtaining the rights which he was seeking. Under the circumstances . . . it is fair to say that the plaintiff had "reason to know"

there was a good defense against the note in question.
Id. at 882-83, 259 N.E.2d at 817. Though the court was construing together
the definition of notice [UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (25) J and a section
relating to notice of incompleteness [UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-304(l)
(a) ],the court nevertheless said that the definition of notice can impose a
duty to make inquiry.
In a case involving the question of good-faith purchase of warehouse
receipts the question involved whether a government agency had notice of a
lien in favor of the other party. The "facts and circumstances" were: (1) a
federal regulation requiring that the purchases be lien-free; and (2) the fact
that a tenant farmer could not be expected to be familiar with the state lien
statute. From these facts the court ascertained that the federal agency had a
duty to make inquiry and thus had "reason to know" of the lien within the
statutory definition of notice. Cleveland v. McNabb, 312 F. Supp. 155 (W.D.
Tenn. 1970).
51E.g., Mountain Fin. Co. v. Powell, 7 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 1223 (Colo.
App. 1970). From evidence showing (I) the finance company knew that they
were purchasing the instruments on the same day they were executed, and
(2) the finance company contacted the buyer and told him that any other
instruments with the seller were inoperative, the court denied preferred
status, finding that the finance company "was fully aware of the nature of
the transaction. Although it may have not had actual knowledge of the entire
scheme ,.- it most assuredly had knowledge of sufficient facts . . .. " Id. at
1225; Sterling Commercial Corp. v. White, 5 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 516 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1968). From evidence showing (I) the purchase of many obligations, (2)
the security interest instrument was to be mailed to te assignee by the recorder, and (8) interrelationship of activities, the court declared that the issue
is a factual one of notice, denying a moton for summary judgment.
52 H.I.M.C. Iv. Co. v. Siciliano, 108 N.J. Super. 27, 86-87, 246 A.2d 502,
507 (1968). The court said the crcumstances of (1) proximity of offices, (2)
provision in note for payment at office of assignee (8) swift transfer of the note
and mortgage and (4) terms of other instruments, illustrated that the financer
had actual knowledge.
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3. Conspiracy to Defraud
Another possible theory with which to attack a bona fide purchaser allegation in cases involving close seller-financer dealings
is by the use of the common law concepts of fraud and conspiracy. Cases in which a maker wishes to assert a defense against
a holder generally involve some kind of fraudulent inducement
or misrepresentation on the part of the seller. Under the principles of civil conspiracy the holder-financer might be held liable
for the fraudulent acts of the seller. A civil conspiracy is a combination or common purpose by two or more persons to do an
unlawful act, or to do what is lawful in an unlawful manner.53 A
course of business whereby a seller routinely transfers obligations
obtained by him to a financer manifests a prior intent to create
commercial paper free from the consumer-assertable defense of
fraud, a common purpose in which the financial institutions participates. This, in itself, is a conspiracy but not actionable conspiracy without the requisite unlawful act. Given an unlawful act
on the part of the seller (e.g., a misrepresentation) or the financer,
together with the common purpose or scheme of creating defensefree commercial paper, conspiracy to commit fraud can be maintained against the seller and financial institution. Proven conspiracy makes the co-conspirators jointly liable for the acts each
committed in pursuance of the conspiracy. 4
For example, in Franklin v. Green- a Tennessee court held
a financer liable for the acts of a contractor by a finding of conspiracy to defraud. Induced by misrepresentations, a homeowner
entered into a contract for the rehabilitation of parts of her home
for a specified price and monthly payment rate, signing a note and
trust deed to secure the indebtedness. The work was only partially
completed, and the actual value of the work done was a mere
fraction of the contract price. The indebtedness was assigned to a
finance company, which at a later date foreclosed when she failed
to pay for the incomplete job. The homeowner contended that the
salesman, the contractor and the finance company conspired to
defraud her, and the lower court held that the proof established a
fraudulent conspiracy on their part. Though the appellate court
63E.g., Mason v. Funderburk, 446 S.W.2d 543 (Ark. 1969);, Switzer v.
Joseph. 442 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969). See Porter v. Mack, 50
W. Va. 581, 40 S.E. 459 (1901).
54 E.g., Porter v. Mack, 50 W. Va. 581, 40 S.E. 459 (1901).
55 47 Tenn. App. 696, 342 S.W.2d 253 (1960).
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did not elaborate upon the relationship of the salesman, contractor, and finance company, the court upheld the finding of
conspiracy, declaring that "the intricate schemes... to make it appear that they participated separately and independently of each
other in the transactions here involved, can avail nothing ...
[a]nd inasmuch as they were engaged in a common enterprise, all
are jointly liable."5 6 Similar issues were presented to the same
court in another case, the court again finding a conspiracy between
6 7
the financer and the seller.
Though there are no cases involving precisely the factual patterns discussed here, civil conspiracy is clearly recognized in West
Virginia, 8 and specifically in regard to conspiracy to commit
fraud. 5 The court has declared that the gist of the action is the
injury produced from the unlawful act, 0 and that conspirary need
not be proven except as an aggravating circumstance to extend liability to co-conspirators for the unlawful acts of one.0' Proof of
conspiracy in this jurisdiction is not an excessively difficult matter.
"[T]he fact that several persons . . . [participate in an unlawful
act], each being aware of the feelings and doings of the other and
approving of the result accomplished often affords evidence of a
confederation or common purpose sufficient to sustain" a finding of
2
conspiracy.
In alleging the co-conspiracy of a finance company, the important consideration is what circumstances should be considered
indicative of the common purpose within the meaning of a conspiracy. Many factual settings are, in themselves, indicative of a
common purpose to defraud the consumer by creating consumer
sales paper to defeat consumer-assertable defenses: e.g., prior
transactions involving a proportionately large number of com56 Id. at 702, 342 S.W.2d at 236. It is noteworthy that in addition to compensatory damages, the court sustained the award of $1000 punitive damages,
also with joint liability.
57Kneeland v. Bruce, 47 Tenn. App. 136, 336 S.W.2d 319 (1960). A distinguishing feature brought out in the evidence was that the financer appeared in the course of dealing with the consumer before the work had begun.
58 Porter v. Mack, 50 W. Va. 581, 40 S.E. 459 (1901). Also Swartz v. Kay,
89 W. Va. 641, 109 S.E. 822 (1921); Parker Paint & Wall Paper Co. v. Local
Union No. 813, 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S.E. 911 (1921); Hendricks v. Forshey, 81
W. Va. 263, 94 S.E. 747 (1917); Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 50
W. Va. 611, 40 S.E. 591 (1902).
59 Wheeling Ice & Storage Co. v. Conner, 61 W. Va. 111, 55 S.E. 982 (1906).
See Id. at 121, 126, 55 S.E. at 986, 988.
60 Porter v. Mack, 50 W. Va. 581, 40 S.E. 459 (1901); Swartz v. Kay, 89 W.
Va. 641, 109 S.E. 822 (1921).
61 Porter v. Mack, 50 W. Va. 581, 585, 40 S.E. 459, 460-61 (1901).
62 Swartz v. Kay, 89 W. Va. 641, 648-49, 109 S.E. 822, 825 (1921).
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plaints, the holder's providing the seller with form instruments, a
provision in form instruments for payment at the office of the
assignee, or consistent swift transfer of consumer sales paper.
Other suspicious circumstances should also be considered as circumstantial. It is not necessary to prove a conspiracy by direct
evidence; circumstantial evidence merely showing a continuous
course of dealing is sufficient. Conspiracy may be inferred from
actions of the parties if it is shown that they pursued the same
unlawful goal, each doing apparently independent acts but with a
concurrence of sentiment. 63 It is important to note that evidence
of prior similar acts is admissible to show circumstantially a common purpose or scheme.64
Though there has been no widespread use of this legal theory
to defeat the protected position of holders of consumer sales paper,
its use should not be overlooked in controversies involving close
seller-financer relationships. The application of the concept would,
of course, defeat the preferred status argument of financers, as
would the application of the U.C.C. statutory definitions discussed above. The consumer's reliance on this theory, either independently or in addition to the statutory definitions, has the
added significance of permitting the financer to be held jointly
liable for punitive damages arising out of the seller's unlawful
acts.6 5

4. Other Arguments
One writer has suggested still another solution to the inequities imposed by a strict adherence to the formalities of the holderin-due-course concept. 6 Underlying this suggestion is the contention that reliance on the good-faith and notice provisions to invalidate purchases of consumer paper without proof of actual
knowledge of consumer defenses is erroneous and contrary to
legislative intent. The suggested solution lies within section
3-305 (2) of the U.C.C., which provides that a holder in due course
"takes the instrument free from.., all defenses of any party to the
instrument with whom he has not dealt.
...7 It is argued that
3E.g., Mason v. Funderburk, 446 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Ark. 1969).
64E.g., Grainger v. Jackson, 122 Ga. App. 123, 176 S.E.2d 279 (1970).
0 E.g., Byers Bros. v. Campbell, 858 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. App. 1961); El
Ranco, Inc. v. First Natl Bank, 406 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1968).
80 Comment, Consumer Financing, Negotiable Instruments, and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Solution to the Judicial Dilemma, 55 Commar. L.

REv. 611, 618-19 (1970).
67

UNIFORM COMM.EcAL CODE

(2) (Michie 1966).

§ 3-505 (2); W. VA.

CODE
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the close business relationship between the seller and financer demands that the buyer be considered a party with whom the finance company has dealt. Thus the buyer's personal defenses are
available to him against the financer.8 This rationale presupposes
a liberal interpretation of the statutorily-undefined, magic word
"dealt". This solution, however, offers no more certainty of application than the more traditional approaches and has marked weaknesses. The financer, if confronted with this argument in a suit
by a defrauded buyer, could argue that the section should be inapplicable for it only applies to defenses.6 9 Secondly, this solution
would leave every court free to define "dealt" to its own satisfaction, thereby introducing additional jurisdictional variations
into the holder-in-due-course concept. Each court would then
be left to a determination of the nature and extent of financer
involvement, just as was necessary in applying the basically undefined N.I.L. requirements."
C. The Factual Circumstances
Although legislative prohibition might be preferable, a strong
judicial pronouncement in this, jurisdiction could be an effective
curb on this consumer sales practice. A forceful declaration would
be required that any one of a number of circumstances indicating
financial institution involvement is, in itself, sufficient to deny
holder-in-due-course status to the purchaser of consumer sales
paper. In developing such a declaration two points should be considered: (1) the circumstances indicative of substantial financer
involvement, and (2) the legal theory or theories applicable to the
finding.
The initial inquiry relates to circumstances adequate to warrant a finding of finance company involvement. Although the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has never been presented
with any significant cases involving an assignee of consumer sales
paper, it has on a number of occasions denied preferred status to a
holder of commercial paper. In cases decided in this jurisdiction
pursuant to the N.I.L., evidence showing close payee-assignee rela-

68 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 3-305;

W.

VA. CODE

ch. 46, art. 3. § 805

(2) (1966).
69
ld.
70

See text at section A supra.
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tionships,71 large discounts, 72 circumlocution of paper,73 knowledge
of the bad reputation of the assignor,74 transfer without endorsement,7 5 usury,78 and preparation of forms by the assignee 77 have
been considered sufficient to deny the purchaser the status of a
holder in due course. In particular the West Virginia Court has
declared that a general business relationship between payee and
assignee of an instrument may be sufficient, in itself, to deny the
78
purchaser protected status.
Although recent U.C.C. cases indicate a trend to deny enhanced status to purchasers of consumer paper,7 9 the factual showings requisite to deny preferred status to a holder have not varied
significantly with the statutory changes.8 0 Financer involvement
shown by evidence indicating prior transactions,8 ' a large discount,s2 approval of credit terms,83 providing form instru-

7' Maryland Fin. Corp. v. Peoples Bank, 99 W. Va. 230, 238, 128 S.E. 294,
296 (1925); Marion Nat'l Bank v. Hardin, 83 W. Va. 119, 124, 126, 97 S.E.
600, 602-3 (1918). See also Merchants & Miners Band v. Gaujot, 102 W. Va. 643
651, 136 S.E. 199, 201 (1926).
72 Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Peoples Bank, 99 W. Va. 544, 553, 130,
S.E. 142, 145-46 (1925); Maryland Fin. Corp. v. Peoples Bank, 99 W. Va. 230,
238, 128 S.E. 294, 296 (1925).
73Marion Nat'l Bank v. Hardin, 83 W. Va. 119, 125, 97 S.E. 600, 602 (1918).
74 Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Peoples Bank, 99 W. Va. 544, 553, 130

S.E. 142, 45-46 (1925).

75 Merchants & Miners Bank v. Gaujot, 102 W. Va. 648, 651, 136 S.E. 199,
201 (1926).
70 Hall v. Mortgage Security Corp., 119 W. Va, 140, 147, 192 S.E. 145,
149-50 (1937). See also Eskridge v. Thomas, 79 W. Va. 822, 91 S.E. 7 (1916).
77 Hall v. Mortgage Security Corp., 119 W. Va. 140, 142, 145, 192 S.E. 145,
149-50 (1937). Though not an issue in the case the court pointed out that the
assignee could not be a holder in due course because it had prepared the loan
contract forms.
is well settled that a general business relation between the payee
78 "It
and the holder may be considered as giving character to a particular transaction, and as affording an inference that a paper discounted within it was
so discounted with constructive notice of any existing infirmity." Maryland
Fin. Corp. v. Peoples Bank, 99 W. Va. 230, 238, 128 S.E. 294, 296 (1925).
70 See cases cited in notes 81-89 infra.
80 Compare text at notes 81-89, with text at notes 90-99, and with text at
notes 100-107 infra.
81 United States Fin. Co. v. Jones, 229 So. 2d 495 (Ala. 1969); Norman v.
Worldwide Distribs., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 58, 195 A.2d 115 (1963); Sterling
Commercial Corp. v. White, 5 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). But
see Ennis v. Atlas Fin. Co., 120 Ga. App. 849 (1969); Milwaukee Acceptance
Corp. v. Dore, 48 Wis. 2d 412, 168 N.W.2d 594 (1969).

82 Winter S. Hirsch, Inc. v Passarelli, 122 111. App. 2d 872, 259 N.E.2d 812
(1970); United States Fin. Co. v. Jones, 229 So. 2d 495 (Ala. 1969).
8American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 45 Ohio Op. 2d 2,

240 N.E.2d 886 (1968). But see Universal CIT Corp. v. Ingel, 847 Mass. 119,
196 N.E.2d 847 (1964).
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ments, 14 investigation of maker's credit, 5 assignor directing recorded instruments to be mailed to the assignee, 6 provision in the
note for payment at the office of the assignee,7 swift transfer of

paper,8 8 and knowledge of the seller's sales techniques, 8 separately
or in various combinations, have been sufficent to deny enhanced
status to the purchaser in cases decided under the U.C.C. In recent
cases involving contracts executed prior to the effective date of the
U.C.C., showing of a prior course of dealing, 9 assignee procurement of credit life insurance, 1 investigation of maker's credit,92 approval of credit terms,9 3 furnishing form instruments 9 4 high discount rate, 5 portion of financer's business which flows from seller, 6 portion of seller's business which goes to the financial institution,9 7 assignee's name on instruments, s and knowledge of seller's
bad reputation99 also warranted a prohibition of enhanced status.
In controversies decided pursuant to the N.I.L. provisions on common law principles, evidence of swift transfer, 100 financer's name on

84

American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 45 Ohio Op. 2d 2,
240 N.E.2d 886 (1968). See generally Rushton v. Credit Corp., 245 Ark. 694, 343
S.W.2d 81 (1968) but here the court said the trial court finding that assignee
was a holder in due course would not be upset because the parties had stipulated8 that the assignee was a holder in due course.
5American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 45 Ohio Op. 2d 2,
240 N.E.2d 886 (1968).
86 Sterling Commercial Corp. v. White, 5 U.C.C. Rptg. Serv. 516 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1968).
87 H.I.M.C. Inv. Co. v. Siciliano, 103 N.J. Super. 27, 246 A.2d 502 (1968).
88 Id.
89 Norman v. Worldwide Distribs. Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115
(1963).
90 Gross v. Applegren, 467 P.2d 789 (Colo. 1970); Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d
405 (1967); Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712
(1967); Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (L. Div.
1962).
0
; Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
92 Id.
93 Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969).
94 Id.; Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1969).
95 Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967).
96 Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969).
971Id.; Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Westfield Inv. Co.
v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (L. Div. 1962).
98 Unico v. Owens, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
99 Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967);
Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (L. Div. 1962).
But see Universal CIT Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847
(1964).
10 Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940);
Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1967).
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instruments,01 checking of consumer's credit before purchase,-O

knowledge of the details of the transaction, 03 knowledge of poor
quality sales goods, 0 4 obtaining insurance for purchaser, 05 knowledge of seller's financial status, 0 and furnishing form instruments, 10 7 separately or in various combinations were sufficiently
indicative of financer involvement to warrant the denial of goodfaith purchaser status.
After a determination that certain factors indicating substantial financial institution involvement are present, the issue
turns to what legal theory is to be applied. The court presented this
question can declare that certain minimal factual circumstances
constitute a showing of lack of "honesty" in terms of the realities
of the consumer paper industry and under the statutory definition
of good faith.10s Or the court can declare that these factual circumstances constitute facts giving the financer "reason to know" of
buyer defenses within the statutory definition of notice. 10 9 Or the
court can find that certain facts showing financer-seller involvement are indicative of a common purpose and thereby constitute
a conspiracy within the meaning of the common law definition."1 0
Whichever theory is applied, facts showing substantial finance
company involvement warrant a denial of preferred status.
Conclusion
Absent legislative action, the manifest injustice to the consumer that has resulted from the sharp practices of some sellers
101 Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941);
Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1958); Commercial Credit Co.
v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940); But see Swanson v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1967); Mann v. Leasko, 179
Cal. App. 2d 692, 4 Cal. Reptr. 124 (1960); Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger
268 Wis.
143, 66 N.W.2d 657 (1954).
' 0 IMutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); But see Swanson
v. Commercial Acceptance Corp., 381 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1967); Universal CIT
Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964).
103 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d
766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
104 Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923);
Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950).
105 See Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923).
100 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d
766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
107 Id.; Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Commercial
Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1075, 137 SW. 2d 260 (1940); International FinCorp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1969).
108 See text at section B-1, supra.
109 See text at section B-2, supra.
110 See text at section B-3, supra.
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